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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a theoretical model that can analyze the impact of gender inequality on long-term 
economic growth. The model is calibrated to fit to Korean data. We find that gender equality policies 
that lower discrimination in the labor market or that increase the time spent by a father on child-
rearing can contribute positively to female labor market participation and per capita income growth. 
The simulation results show that when the disparities between men and women at home and in the 
labor market are completely removed, the female labor force participation rate increases from 54.4% 
to 67.5%, and the growth rate in per capita income rises from 3.6% to 4.1% on average over a 
generation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Republic of Korea has made significant economic progress in the past 50 years, as demonstrated 
by the increase in its per capita income from just $80 in 1960 to over $24,000 in 2013. A critical factor 
for the Republic of Korea’s economic success has been its fast-growing, well-educated labor force. 
From 1960 to 2010, the share of adults who had completed secondary schooling or higher soared from 
20% to an impressive 87% in 2010 (Barro and Lee 2013). This abundance of well-educated workers 
has brought about higher levels of labor productivity and higher returns on investment and has 
developed capabilities for facilitating technological adoption and innovation. Low-cost and good-
quality labor thus became the foundation for the Republic of Korea’s successful export-oriented 
development strategy. 
 
During its period of rapid industrialization and development, the Republic of Korea made 
substantial strides toward gender equality in education and employment opportunities. The gender 
gap has become negligible in the secondary school enrollment rates and in the advancement rates to 
higher education. More noticeable than ever before is the presence of women in such elite professions 
as law, medicine, and high-level civil service. 
 
There is still a significant gender gap in labor market participation, however. According to 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, only 55% of Korean women 
from ages 15 to 64 are in the labor force compared to 65% for OECD countries on average. The 
Republic of Korea’s female labor force participation rate (LFPR) substantially lags behind the male 
participation rate of about 77%, which is close to the OECD average of 79%.  
 
The LFPR of Korean women shows an M-shaped pattern over the life cycle. Due to career 
interruption after marriage or child birth, that rate drops significantly in their late 20s and early 30s. 
More Korean women are likely to be eventually attracted to the labor market but child-rearing remains 
a major obstacle for highly educated and capable female workers who want to continue their careers. 
Korean mothers remain primarily responsible for raising children, and inflexible work environments 
along with a lack of affordable, good-quality childcare facilities make it challenging for them to balance 
work and home.  
 
Korean women generally have a strong perception that there is gender inequality in various 
parts of society. According to the 2002 Social Survey by Statistics Korea, 72.4% of women have that 
perception. This finding was also borne out by the Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic 
Forum, which ranked the Republic of Korea 111th in gender equality in 2013 (Table 1). The World 
Economic Forum index takes into account women’s general standing in (i) economic participation and 
opportunity, (ii) educational attainment, (iii) health, and (iv) political empowerment. 
 
The Korean government aims to change this. In a 3-year plan for economic innovation 
announced in February 2014, it set the major goal of increasing the female employment rate from the 
current 54% to 62% by 2017. This goal will be pursued by encouraging female workers to remain in the 
workforce through such measures as providing affordable, good-quality childcare facilities, and 
expanding paid parental leave.  
 
Given this background, the objective of this paper is to assess the output cost of gender 
inequality and the impacts of gender-based policies on female labor force participation and on the 
Republic of Korea’s long-term economic growth. In particular, we will examine which gender-based 
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policy is most effective in enhancing the growth rate of per capita income. We will also examine how 
high the female LFPR can rise if gender bias is eliminated. 
 
Table 1: The Global Gender Gap Index Ranking in 2013 
 
Country Overall 
Economic 
Participation and 
Opportunity 
Educational 
Attainment 
Health and 
Survival 
Political 
Empowerment 
Iceland 1 22 1 97 1 
Finland 2 19 1 1 2 
Norway 3 1 1 93 3 
Sweden 4 14 38 69 4 
Philippines 5 16 1 1 10 
Germany 14 46 86 49 15 
United States 23 6 1 33 60 
Sri Lanka 55 109 48 1 30 
Singapore 58 12 105 85 90 
Thailand 65 50 78 1 89 
People’s Republic of China 69 62 81 133 59 
Viet Nam 73 52 95 132 80 
Bangladesh 75 121 115 124 7 
Indonesia 95 103 101 107 75 
India 101 124 120 135 9 
Malaysia 102 100 73 75 121 
Japan 105 104 91 34 118 
Republic of Korea 111 118 100 75 86 
Pakistan 135 135 129 124 64 
Source: Bekhouch, Y., R. Hausmann, L. D. Tyson, and S. Zahidi, S. 2013. The Global Gender Gap Report 2013. Geneva: World Economic Forum. 
 
A key source of the gap in the labor force participation of women and men is how Korean 
women allocate their time. At all levels of incomes, they tend to do the majority of housework and 
childcare, correspondingly having less time for work in the labor market. Moreover, there is still 
significant gender discrimination in the labor market.  
 
The model we are presenting, built on a model presented in a separate paper accompanying 
this study (Kim, Lee, and Shin 2015), accounts endogenously for women’s time allocation between 
home production, child-rearing, and market work, and then analyzes how gender inequality at home 
and in the labor market affects female labor force participation and economic growth. We calibrated 
the model to fit its steady-state values to the observed values from the Republic of Korea and 
conducted simulations to quantitatively measure the opportunity cost of gender inequality in terms of 
foregone output as well as the impacts of gender-based policies on women’s labor market participation 
and economic growth.  
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There is an increasing body of literature on gender equality and growth.
1
 Existing theoretical 
literature emphasizes three channels through which gender equality influences growth— female labor 
market participation, average human capital stock, and fertility. A considerable number of empirical 
papers have investigated the impact of gender inequality in education and employment on economic 
growth and the majority of these studies have found that gender inequality indeed adversely affects 
economic growth.   
 
Gender inequality having lately become a pressing issue in Korean society, many Korean 
researchers have studied various aspects of female labor supply and household work, mostly using 
microeconomic perspectives. Kim and Sung (2007), Woo (2008), Cho (2009), and Choi (2011) have 
estimated the labor supply function of Korean women empirically or by model calibration in their 
investigation of the effects of various government policies like subsidies for childcare and earned 
income tax credits. Kim and Cho (2003), and Kim (2012) have studied the determinants of labor 
market reentry by married women after childbirth or childcare leave, including several gender-related 
policies. Heo (2008) has examined the factors for time spent on household production by men and 
women.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no academic research using macroeconomic perspectives has 
yet been undertaken to assess the effects of gender inequality on economic growth in the context of 
the Korean economy. This paper, which is an effort to fill this gap, proceeds as follows after this 
introductory section. Section II provides an overview of gender issues in the Republic of Korea. In 
section III, which introduces the formal model, we calibrate it and derive the benchmark steady state 
that is characterized by a balanced growth path. In section IV, we experiment on the effects of gender 
equality policies and estimate the output cost of gender inequality. Section V provides concluding 
observations. 
 
 
II. GENDER INEQUALITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
The modern Korean woman faces various dimensions of inequalitysocial, cultural, and economic. 
From a historical perspective, the gender inequality problem has been improving greatly since the 
takeoff of the Korean economy in the 1970s. However, Korean women still have many hurdles to 
overcome to get equal treatment from the various sectors of society.  
 
On a positive note, the educational attainment of women in the Republic of Korea has 
improved substantially in the last half century. In 1990, the average years of schooling for Korean 
women in their 30s was 10.4 while the average years for men was 11.8. By 2010, those averages had 
risen to 13.9 for women and to 14.1 for men. However, if we consider only women in their 20s, their 
average schooling years actually reached 14.3 in 2010, even higher than the 13.9 years of their male 
counterparts (Social Indicators in Korea, Statistics Korea).  
 
The general improvement in gender equality in the Republic of Korea was also manifest in the 
change in sex ratio at birth. In 1990, at the peak of its rise, the sex ratio at birth—measured by the 
number of boys born per 100 girls—reached 116.5; by 2007, that ratio fell down to the normal level of 
106. It is widely believed that the high sex ratio at birth in the past was mainly due to gender inequality 
                                                            
1
  See Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015) for a succinct survey of recent papers. 
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in Korean society. That the sex ratio has gone down to the normal level could be an indicator that 
Korean parents no longer perceive any disadvantage in having daughters instead of sons. 
 
Even with these indications of improvement in gender equality, however, significant inequality 
between men and women still persists in various forms in the Republic of Korea.  
 
A. Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation Rate 
 
Despite the Republic of Korea’s rapid economic growth and its having caught up with advanced 
economies since the 1970s, the labor force participation of its women still lags behind that of women in 
other developed countries. Indeed, in 2012, the female LFPR in the Republic of Korea was at 55.2% still 
one of the lowest among OECD countries. In comparison, that LFPR was 12.3 percentage points lower 
than that of the United States.2  
 
The LFPR of Korean women is significantly lower than that of males, and the gap is wider than 
that in most OECD countries. Based on OECD statistics, in 2011, the difference in LFPR between men 
and women was 23.4 percentage points in the Republic of Korea against 11 percentage points in the 
United States, 12.5 percentage points in the United Kingdom, and 17.5 percentage points on average in 
all the OECD countries. This wide gender gap in LFPR in the Republic of Korea has been quite 
persistent over time. 
 
The gender difference in the Republic of Korea’s LFPR becomes more pronounced when we 
divide the labor force participation by marital status. In 2011, the LFPR of married men in the Republic 
of Korea was at 82.8% and that of single men at 52.2%. On the other hand, the LFPR of married 
women was at 49.3% and that of single women at 50.9%. Between the Republic of Korea’s married 
men and women, the gender gap in LFPR was thus much wider. 
 
The falling LFPR of the Republic of Korea’s married women is well documented in the so-
called M curve of labor supply over life cycle. When we plot the employment rate of different cohorts 
in the Republic of Korea, we find a dip in the employment rate for Korean women in their 30s. In 
contrast, that of Korean men shows no decrease (Figure 1). 
 
The significantly lower labor market participation by the Republic of Korea’s married women is 
viewed as a reflection of the large burden of childcare on married women. The Korea Time Use Survey 
conducted in 2009 reports that time spent by a wife for childcare is, on average, more than three times 
longer than that by a husband—55 minutes per day versus 14 minutes.  
 
The gender gap in LFPR is even more pronounced among the highly educated. In 2011, 
according to the Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey by Statistics Korea, the 
LFPR of Korean men with college education or more was 88.3%, while that of their female 
counterparts was 62.9%. This difference is disturbing because it implies a significant misuse of human 
resources for the Korean economy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2
  See OECD. http://stats.oecd.org 
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B. Gender Gap in Employment Rate 
 
The female employment rate varies greatly across educational groups. According to the Statistical 
Yearbook of Education by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the employment rate 
among female high school graduates in 2011 was 27.3%, higher than the employment rate of 20.2% 
among male high school graduates.  
 
Figure 1: Cohort Employment Rate in 2013: Male versus Female in the 
Republic of Korea 
 
 
Source: OECD. http://stats.oecd.org 
 
Among the more educated, however, a reversal has been reported in the magnitude of the 
employment rate of men versus women. In 2011, the employment rates of men and women with a 
master’s degree or higher were 80.6% and 59.4%, respectively. On the other hand, the employment 
rates of men and women with a bachelor’s degree were 58.7% and 50%, respectively. This suggests 
that about half of female college graduates who are provided with adequate skills for the labor market 
are not contributing to the economy—a considerable economic loss for the Republic of Korea. 
 
The gender gap is reported to be present not just in the quantitative dimension of 
employment, but also in the qualitative. Table 2 below shows the male–female difference in 
employment types. For example, among those employed in 2011, only 3.2% of all women owned their 
own businesses against 8.4% of all men owning their own businesses. Moreover, the fraction of 
temporary workers among women was almost twice higher than that among men, 28.7% versus 15%. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Workers by Employment Types 
 
Sex Year Total Employer 
Own Account 
Workers 
Unpaid Family 
Workers Regular Temporary Daily
Female 1990 100.0 2.7 16.0 24.5 21.4 22.5 12.9
1995 100.0 3.3 16.0 21.1 25.5 24.2 9.8
2000 100.0 3.0 16.2 19.2 19.1 28.5 13.9
2005 100.0 3.5 15.4 14.0 25.6 30.2 11.3
2010 100.0 3.3 12.9 10.9 34.5 30.0 8.4
2011 100.0 3.2 12.4 10.7 37.1 28.7 7.9
Male 1990 100.0 9.0 25.4 2.5 40.7 14.1 8.3
1995 100.0 10.2 22.4 1.7 44.4 13.1 8.1
2000 100.0 9.6 24.1 2.0 38.1 17.1 9.2
2005 100.0 10.0 22.8 1.3 41.1 16.4 8.5
2010 100.0 8.4 20.3 1.3 47.9 15.1 7.0
2011 100.0 8.4 20.3 1.2 49.5 15.0 6.8
Source: Statistics Korea. 2011. Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
C.  Gender Gap in Wages 
 
Another gender gap can also be observed in the economic performance of women compared to men 
based on their respective wage rates in the labor market. In 2010, the average monthly wage—the total 
of the monthly salary and the monthly share of the annual bonus—is reported to be 2 million Korean 
won (W) for women against W3.2 million for men  (Survey on Labor Conditions by Type of 
Employment 2010, Ministry of Employment and Labor). This implies that Korean women on average 
earn only 64% of what Korean men earn.  
 
This wage gap has actually become narrower since the economic takeoff in the Republic of 
Korea, for the female–male wage ratio was only 0.47 in 1985 but had grown to 0.63 in 2000, based on 
the Surveys on Labor Conditions by Type of Employment. Our concern is that the gap has remained 
substantial, not further narrowing significantly from that level since the early 2000s.  
 
For women with higher education, the gender gap in wage is narrower but still considerable. In 
2010, women with a bachelor’s degree or higher earned about 66% of what men with the same 
academic qualification earned in 2010.  
 
Interestingly, the wage gap between men and women is more pronounced in occupations that 
require more advanced skills. In 2010, women in professional occupations such as medical doctors and 
lawyers earned only 61.7% of what their male counterparts earned, compared to 64% of what all 
Korean women earned on average against those earned by all Korean men.  
 
D. Women’s Representation in Politics and Government  
 
Beyond the economic aspects of gender inequality, concerns have been raised about the level of 
Korean women’s representation and participation in politics and government.  
 
In 2008, only 41 women were elected to the 299-seat 18th National Assembly. This was a 
significant improvement from earlier elections; in the 14th National Assembly elections in 1992, for 
example, the female representation was only 1% or 3 out of 299 seats. With women constituting more 
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than half of the Korean population, they are thus still remarkably underrepresented in the political 
arena.  
 
Compared to the political sector, women appear to be better represented in the government 
sector. In 2010, the percentage of female government employees at the federal government level was 
41%. This share is nonetheless still significantly below the parity level of 50%.  
 
It is also recognized that Korean women are not well represented at the administrative levels of 
both private and public firms. Based on a survey conducted by GMI Ratings (2013), the fraction of 
women in corporate boards is only 1.9% in the Republic of Korea against 11.8% in OECD countries, 
making the Republic of Korea rank 43rd out of the 45 countries surveyed. The survey also found that in 
the Republic of Korea, 19.5% of corporations with more than 100 employees have no female executive 
at all. 
 
E. Government Policies on Gender Inequality 
 
The Korean government has been pursuing various policies to improve the welfare of women in the 
Republic of Korea and to reduce gender inequality. A parallel objective of these policies is to 
encourage childbearing owing to the accelerated aging of Korean society that has been accompanied 
by extremely low fertility rates during the last few decades.  
 
With these policies, the Korean government in general aims to provide women with a better 
environment for childbearing and child-rearing so as to encourage and enable them to return to the 
labor market even as they are raising children.  
 
The policies can be categorized into three types: 
 
(i) The first type of policies includes those aimed at helping women give birth successfully 
and at lowering the cost of childbearing for couples. These are: 
(a) Maternity and paternity leave (for childbirth); 
(b) Childcare leave of absence (for children ages 0–6): maximum of 1 year with pay; 
and 
(c) Reduced work hours during child-rearing (for children ages 0–6): maximum of 1 
year combined with childcare leave of absence. 
(ii) The second type of policies aims at providing parents with more reliable childcare 
facilities for children in grade schools. These are: 
(a) Incentives for firms to provide childcare centers at work: implemented in June 
2013; 
(b) Providing public childcare centers; 
(c) Financial support for childcare; and 
(d) Encouraging private and public childcare centers with financial incentives to offer 
flexible hours for childcare; this was implemented starting July 2014. 
(iii) The third type of policies aims at giving companies incentives to hire back women after 
childbirth or childcare. At present, private firms can receive tax subsidies if they employ 
female workers who are trying to return to the labor market after child-rearing. 
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These policies have been successful to some extent in promoting female labor market 
participation. For instance, in 2014, the female employment rate among women from age 15 and over 
rose above the 50% mark—50.4% to be exact—for the first time (Economically Active Population 
Survey 2014, Statistics Korea). However, the Republic of Korea’s female employment rate is still 
significantly lower than that of many advanced economies like Canada (69.2%), Japan (60.7%), and 
Sweden (71.8%). This leaves a lot of room for the Korean government to implement better policies for 
encouraging women’s participation in the labor market. 
 
 
III. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The theoretical model we have developed has a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) structure 
where various aspects of gender inequality are related to the economy’s growth performance. Based 
on a similar model, Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015) have shown that improving gender equality can 
contribute significantly to economic growth by changing female time allocation and promoting 
accumulation of human capital.
3
 
 
In order to apply to the Korean economy, we modified the model introduced in Kim, Lee, and 
Shin (2015) in the following ways: 
 
(i) First, aside from market and home production, males allocate some of their time to child-
rearing and education. This modification is essential for examining the impact of a 
government policy that encourages males to spend more time in child-rearing.  
(ii) Second, we assume that the father’s education level as well as that of the mother’s 
determines the accumulation of human capital by their children. This change, along with 
the change in the first modification that males allocate time to education, will allow us to 
investigate the perfect gender-equality case where males and females behave exactly in 
the same way.  
(iii) Third, we remove the parental bias in favor of sons in time allocation and in the 
preference for educating children because there seems to be no evidence now of that 
bias in favor of sons.  
(iv) Fourth and finally, we assume in the benchmark model that the government revenue is 
not spent on any growth-enhancing activities. This will allow us to explore a possible 
government policy that switches spending from unproductive usage to education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3   The model in Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015) is built on Agénor (2012), but differs in several important dimensions. First, Kim, 
Lee, and Shin (2015) explicitly considers the difference between the quantity and quality of children in terms of their 
costs, following Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990), and allows the altruism in utility, as in Ehrlich and Lui (1991). Second, 
the model assumes the existence of a fixed cost per child and a distinct time cost in educating children. Finally, it also 
assumes that husbands take limited responsibility in household production, which is one aspect of the gender gap. 
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A. Model Structure 
 
In the economy, every individual’s lifetime has three periods: childhood, adulthood (at middle age), and 
retirement (at old age). There is a continuum of identical families consisting of parents born at time (t-
1) and children born at time t. The family’s utility function at time t is as follows: 
 
						 ௧ܷ ൌ ߟ௖ 11 െ ߪ ܿ௧
ଵିఙ ൅ ߟ௤ 11 െ ߪ ݍ௧
ଵିఙ 
൅ߟ௘ ቈ ଵଵିఙ ൬ቀ
௡೟
ଶ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାଵ௠ ൰
ଵିఙ
൅ ଵଵିఙ ൬ቀ
௡೟
ଶ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାଵ௙ ൰
ଵିఙ
቉ ൅ ௣ಲଵାఘ
ଵ
ଵିఙ ܿ௧ାଵଵିఙ  (1) 
 
where ܿ௧  (ܿ௧ାͩ) is the family’s total consumption during the parents’ adulthood (parents’ retirement), ݍ௧  consumption (and production) of home goods, ݊௧  the number of children (of which half are sons 
and the other half are daughters), ݁௧ାͩ௠  (݁௧ାͩ௙ ሻ the education level of sons (daughters) that will 
determine the efficiency of male (female) adult workers at t+1, ρ ൐ ͨ the time discount rate, ߪିͩ the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ݌஺ the probability of survival from adulthood to retirement. 
The coefficient jC  pertains to relative preference for today’s consumption, ߟ௤  to relative preference 
for the home-produced good, and ߟ௘  to relative preference for children’s education. 
 
We assume that the female adult divides her time for four uses: market production, home 
production, child-rearing, and child education. Thus, the time constraint for the female is as follows: 
 
 ݄௧௪ ൅ ݄௧௤ ൅ ݄௧ோ ൅ ݄௧௘ ൌ ͩ (2) 
 
where ݄௧௪ is the adult female’s time allocated to market production,	݄௧௤ her time allocated to home 
production,	݄௧ோ  her time allocated to child-rearing, and	݄௧	௘  her time allocated to child education.  
 
We assume that 
 
 ݄௧௠௤ ൌ ݂݄ͩ௧௤	 (3) 
 
where ݄௧௠௤  is the male adult’s time allocated to home production and ݂ͩ  represents the bargaining 
power of a wife with respect to home production. Equation 3 implies that the decision on time 
allocation to home production by the male and by the female is done in two steps: first, the decision on 
the female’s time allocated to home production is made, and then second, the bargaining power of a 
female determines the male’s proportionate time allocation to home production. The bigger the 
bargaining power of the women, the higher is the proportion. For simplicity, we assume that ݂ͩ  is 
exogenously determined and constant. Generally ݂ͩ ൏ ͩ and perfect equality is obtained if ݂ͩ ൌ ͩ. This 
two-step decision allows us to focus solely on the female’s decision, thus simplifying the problem. We 
will make the same assumption for the time allocation to other uses. 
 
We assume that ݄௧ோ ൌ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧	where ͪݒ is rearing time needed per child. Again the male’s 
time allocated to child-rearing is 
 
 ݄௧௠ோ ൌ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧  (4) 
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where ݂ͪ  represents the bargaining power of a female with respect to child-rearing. ݂ͪ  is not necessarily 
equal to ݂ͩ  since the comparative advantage of the male and the female in these activities are not the 
same. In general, the female has more comparative advantage in child-rearing particularly if child-
rearing also involves breast-feeding. 
 
Finally, the time allocated to education satisfies ݄௧௘ ൌ ݊௧߳௧௘	where ߳௧௘	is average education time 
spent for each child. We assume that the female allocates her time equally between sons and 
daughters. The male’s time allocated to child-rearing per child is determined by 
 
 ߳௧௠௘ ൌ ଷ݂߳௧௘	 (5) 
 
where ݂ͫ  represents the bargaining power of a female with respect to child education. Hence, the total 
time spent on child education by the male is ݄௧௠௘ ൌ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘. 
 
Then the time constraint faced by the female can be represented as follows: 
 
 ݄௧௪ ൅ ݄௧௤ ൅ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ 	൅ ݊௧߳௧௘ ൌ ͩ (6) 
 
The home production function is 
 
 ݍ௧ ൌ ݍതሺ݄௧௤ ൅ ݄௧௠௤ሻఊሾ൫݁௧௙൯
ఞሺ݁௧௠ሻͩିఞͩሿ=	ݍതሺͩ ൅ ݂ͩ ሻఊሺ݄௧௤ሻఊሾ൫݁௧௙൯
ఞͩሺ݁௧௠ሻͩିఞͩሿ (7) 
 
where ݁௧௙ and ݁௧௠	are the education level of mother and father, and the second equality holds because 
of (3). We assume that time spent by a male is perfectly substitutable with time spent by a female. 
However, we assume that the education of a female and a male is introduced as a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form where ߯ͩ and ͩ െ ߯ͩ are the output elasticity of female and male education. 
 
The education level of children that will become productivity when they become adults is 
determined by three factors: the average government spending on education per (surviving) child, a 
mother’s human capital ݁௧௙, and the time mothers allocate to each child, as follows:
4
 
 
 ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሾ൫݁௧௙൯
ఞͩሺ݁௧௠ሻͩିఞͩሿͩିఔͩሺሺͩ ൅ ݂ͫ ሻ߳௧௘ሻఔͪ  (8) 
 
where ܩ௧  is total government spending, ߤ an indicator of efficiency of government spending, ௧ܰ 	the 
number of individuals of generation t, and ݊௧௔ the average number of children in the households. Since 
we assume the representative household, ݊௧௔ ൌ ݊௧  holds in equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4
  The formulas for children’s human capital accumulation do not include the role of private education spending. However, 
the mother’s time can be interpreted as comprising private educational spending. The model can be extended to include 
the allocation of family income to education of children, though the solution of the model becomes much complicated. 
Impact of Gender Inequality on the Republic of Korea’s Long-Term Economic Growth   |   11 
 
The household budget constraint at t and t+1 are:5 
 
 ܿ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (9) 
 
 ܿ௧ାͩ ൌ ሺͩା௥೟శͩሻ௦೟௣ಲ  (10) 
 
where τ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ is the tax rate, ݏ௧ saving, ݎ௧ାͩ interest rate between t and t+1, and ݓ௧ு  total gross wage income for the household. 
 
ݓ௧ு ൌ ݁௧௠݄௧௠௪ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ 
	ൌ ݁௧௠ሺ1 െ ଵ݂݄௧௤ െ ଶ݂ݒ݊௧ െ ଷ݂݊௧߳௧௘ሻݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙ሺ1 െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺ2 െ ଶ݂ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻݓ௧௙  (11) 
 
where ݄௧௠௪ ൌ ͩ െ ݄௧௠௤ െ ݄௧௠ோ െ ݄௧௠௘  is the time allocated by the male to market production. In this 
expression, ݁௧௠݄௧௠௪  and ݁௧௙݄௧௪ measure labor supply by male and female adults in efficiency units, and 
ݓ௧௠ and ݓ௧௙  are effective market wages for male and female adults, respectively. 
 
The household maximizes the utility (1) with respect to ܿ௧ , ܿ௧ାͩ, ݄௧௤ , ߳௧௘ , and ݊௧  subject to the 
constraints (2)–(11). The first order conditions for ܿ௧  and ܿ௧ାͩ implies that 
 
 ሺ௖೟శͩ௖೟ ሻ
ఙ ൌ ͩା௥೟శͩఎ೎ሺͩାఘሻ (12) 
 
It is useful to derive the saving rate from (12) as follows: 
 
 θ௧ ൌ ͩ െ ͩͩା ುಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
 (13) 
 
Market output is produced by identical firms whose number is normalized to unity. Each 
identical firm i’s production function takes the following form: 
 
 ௧ܻ௜ ൌ തܻሺܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠௪ ௧ܰ௠,௜ሻఈሺܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙,௜ሻఈሺܭ௧௜ሻͩିͪఈ  (14) 
 
where α ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ is the elasticity of output with respect to male and female effective labor that is 
assumed to be the same. Since the representative firm hires labor from the labor market, it hires male 
and female workers with average labor productivity (education level) ܧ௧௠ and ܧ௧௙ , respectively. The 
average male and female adult’s time allocated to market production is denoted by ܪ௧௠௪  and ܪ௧௪  and 
the number of male and female workers are  ௧ܰ
௠,௜and ௧ܰ
௙,௜ . Finally ܭ௧௜	is the amount of capital stock 
employed by firm i. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5
  As in Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015), we assume that the savings made by adults who do not survive to old age are confiscated 
by the government and equally distributed in lump sum to the surviving adults when they become old. Hence the return 
rate of saving, ሺͩା௥೟ሻ௣ಲ  is higher than the actual interest rate, ͩ ൅ ݎ௧. 
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Profits of firm i are represented as follows: 
 
 Π௧௜ ൌ ௧ܻ௜ െ ൫ݓ௧௠ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠,௜ ൅ ݓ௧௙ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙,௜൯ െ ݎ௧ܭ௧௜ (15) 
 
where the price of the marketed good is normalized to unity and ݎ௧  is the rental rate of capital that is 
identical to the rate of return to savings. The firm, taking input prices as given, maximizes profits with 
respect to the number of male and female workers and capital.  
 
As in Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015), we assume that there is discrimination in the labor market 
against female workers: while male workers receive their marginal product, female workers receive a 
faction d ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ of their marginal product. For simplicity, we assume that firms do not distribute to 
households the profits accrued due to female discrimination in the labor market. Then the optimal 
choices of the firm for labor and capital satisfy the following  equations: 
 
 ݓ௧௠ ൌ ఈ௒೟
೔
ா೟೘ு೟೘ೢே೟೘,೔
, ݓ௧௙ ൌ ௗఈ௒೟
೔
ா೟೑ு೟ೢ ே೟೑,೔
, ݎ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ͪߙሻ ௒೟
೔
௄೟೔ (16) 
 
In equilibrium, ௧ܰ
௠,௜ ൌ ௧ܰ௠, 	 ௧ܰ௙,௜ ൌ ௧ܰ௙and ܭ௧௜ ൌ ܭ௧  for all i and the aggregate output is, 
 
 ௧ܻ ൌ ׬ ௧ܻ௜ͩͨ ൌ തܻሺܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠௪ ௧ܰ௠ሻఈሺܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙ሻఈሺܭ௧ሻͩିͪఈ  (17) 
 
From (14) and the equilibrium conditions, the following relation holds between ݓ௧௠ and ݓ௧௙ : 
 
 ݓ௧௠ܧ௧௠௪ܪ௧௠ ൌ ݀ିͩݓ௧௙ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪  (18) 
 
In equilibrium the following equations hold: ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠௪ ൌ ܪ௧௠௪  and ݄௧௪ ൌ ܪ௧௪ . 
 
The government finances its expenditure on education, ܩ௧  and on unproductive usage, ௧ܷ  by 
taxing the wage income.
6
 We assume that the expenditure on the unproductive usage is proportional to 
that on education: ௧ܷ ൌ ∅ܩ௧ . Further, we assume that the government budget is balanced every period: 
 
 ܩ௧ ൅ ௧ܷ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙ݓ௧௙൯  (19) 
 
where ߬ is the tax rate of government expenditure. Then 
 
 ሺͩ ൅ ∅ሻܩ௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ ௧ܰ௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ ௧ܰ௙ݓ௧௙൯  (20) 
or  
 
 ሺͩ ൅ ∅ሻ݃௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ݓ௧௙൯  (21) 
 
where ݃௧ ≡ ீ೟ே೟೑ ൌ
ீ೟
ே೟/ͪ. 
                                                            
6
  The model can be easily extended to allow nondistortionary revenue financing public education expenditures or 
unproductive government spending reallocated to the education sector. This extension will produce a more positive 
contribution to economic growth in the form of an increase in government education spending.  
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In equilibrium, from (16) and (18) 
 
ሺͩ ൅ ∅ሻ݃௧ ൌ ߬൫ܧ௧௠ܪ௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ܧ௧௙ܪ௧௪ݓ௧௙൯ ൌ ߬൫݁௧௠݄௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙൯=τሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ 
ൌ ͪ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻ	ߙ ௒೟ே೟ (22) 
 
or 
 
 ሺͩ െ ∅ሻܩ௧ ൌ ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻ	ߙ ௧ܻ  (23) 
 
The competitive equilibrium satisfies the following three conditions: 
 
(i) The household maximizes utility (1) with respect to ܿ௧, ܿ௧ାͩ, ݊௧, ݄௧௪, ݄௧௤, ݄௧ோ,				and ݄௧௘ . 
(ii) The firm maximizes profits with respect to ௧ܰ௠,௜ , ௧ܰ௙,௜ , and ܭ௧௜ .  
(iii) Markets cleared. In particular the asset-market clearing condition requires that total 
savings by all households (ͨ.ͭ ௧ܰሻ in period t are equal to total capital stock at the 
beginning of period (t+1): ͨ.ͭ ௧ܰݏ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ௙ݏ௧ ൌ ܭ௧ାͩ. 
 
In the balanced growth path, it can be easily verifiable that ௒೟ே೟ and 
௄೟
ே೟ grow at the same rate as ݁௧
௙. 
Hence, the female education (that is the same as the male education) is the key to perpetual growth. 
 
The growth rate of per capita gross domestic product in steady state is:7 
 
ͩ ൅ ߛ௒/ே ൌ ͪ തܻሺͩ െ ݂݄௤∗ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊∗ െ ݂ͫ ݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௤∗ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊∗ െ ݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈሺ݇∗ሻିͪఈ݀ߙΦߠ∗ሺ݊∗ሻିͩ 
 (24) 
 
where the variables with * are steady-state values and ݇௙∗ ൌ ሺ ௄௘೑ே೑ሻ∗. 
 
B. Calibration and Balanced Growth Path 
 
Most parameter values are from the macroeconomics literature and Kim, Lee, and Shin (2015). Some 
of our parameters are derived from the calibration of our model to fit into its steady-state values, 
which are derived from the average values from the Republic of Korea for the period 2005–2010 as 
reported in the World Development Indicators by the World Bank, Bank of Korea data, and Korea 
Time Use Survey (2009) data. The values are as follows: 
 
(i) Fertility: 1.17, 
(ii) Annual per capita income growth rate: 3.6%, 
(iii) Net private saving rate (% of disposable income): 16.1%,8 
(iv) Female and male LFPR: 54.43% and 75.92%, 
(v) Wife–husband ratio of child-rearing time: 5.19 (51 minutes a day by wife and 10 minutes 
by husband), and 
                                                            
7  See the appendix for the derivation. 
8  Net saving rate is private saving rate (22.1%) minus depreciation (6%). 
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(vi) Wife–husband ratio of child education time: 3.25 (26 minutes a day by wife and 8 
minutes by husband). 
 
f2 is derived from (2  f2)/f2 = 5.1. f3 is derived from 1/f3 = 3.25. Since the male LFPR in our model is 
(ͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘), parameter f1 can be estimated from the equation: 
݂ͩ ݄௧௤ = 1  0.7592 െ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ , 
 
where ݄௧௤ , ݊௧ , and ߳௧௘  are endogenously determined in our model. From the calibration with other 
average values, we are able to pin down the following parameter values: 
 
f1 = 0.5897, 
f2 = 0.3279, 
f3 = 0.3077, 
v = 2.8099, 
 = 0.5982, 
݁̅ = 4.2797, and 
ݍത = 23.6313. 
 
Table 3 reports the parameter values used for the calibration, and Table 4 presents the steady-
state values of key variables in the model economy. 
 
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters 
 
Parameter Value Description 
Households  
ρ 0.5982 Annual discount rate
σ 0.8 Inverse of elasticity of substitution
஺ܲ 0.987 Survival probability
δ 1.05 Preference parameter for number of children 
ߟ௘  0.2 Preference parameters for children’s education 
ߟ௤ 12 Family preference parameter for home production output
ߟ௖  3.5 Preference parameter for consumption 
ݒ 2.8099 
Home output 
γ 0.122 Curvature of production function
f1 0.5897 Bargaining power of a female in home production 
f2 0.3279 Bargaining power of a female in child-rearing 
f3 0.3077 Bargaining power of a female in child-rearing 
ݍത 23.6313 
߯ 0.8 
Market output  
α 0.4 Elasticity w.r.t. labor input
d 0.6 Gender bias in the workplace
തܻ  1 
continued on next page
                                                                                                                                                                                               
9
   Child-rearing time includes time spent on washing, feeding, sending off to school, putting in bed, and transporting of 
children. Child education time includes time spent on helping homework, teaching, and reading. 
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Table 3   continued 
Parameter Value Description 
Human capital   
߭ͩ 0.4 Elasticity w.r.t. public spending in education 
߭ͪ 0.3 Elasticity w.r.t. public–private ratio
  
݁̅ 4.2797 
Government 
τ 0.163 Tax rate on marketed output
μ 0.39 Education spending efficiency parameter 
∅ 3 Factor of unproductive, exogenous government expenditure 
to educational expenditure 
w.r.t. = with respect to. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 4: Steady-State Solutions 
 
Variables Value Description 
݌௖݊ 1.17 Fertility rate (݊ = 1.17)
݄௠ 0.7592 Labor force participation rate of males  
݄௪ 0.5443 Labor force participation rate of females 
ߠ 0.1610 Net private savings rate 
ߛ௒/ே  1.889 Per capita growth rate (= 1.036030 – 1) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GENDER INEQUALITY  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
A. Output Costs of Gender Inequality 
 
We can measure the output costs of gender inequality by comparing the performances of the 
benchmark case with those of a hypothetical Korean economy with no gender inequality. In the 
hypothetical gender-equal case, males and females have the same opportunities and power at home, 
in education, and in the labor markets.  
 
Table 5 illustrates the alternative steady state of the economy with complete gender equality 
(݀ ൌ ͩ, and ݂ͩ ൌ ݂ͪ ൌ ݂ͫ ൌ ͩ). The table shows the values of fertility rate, female labor participation 
rate, and per capita output growth rate in the new steady state.  
 
According to the simulation results, with complete gender equality, the female labor market 
participation rate increases from 54.4 to 67.5. Note that in our framework, the LFPRs for males and 
females are equal with no gender bias at home and labor market. Per capita output growth rate in the 
new steady state increases to a higher value. The results show that by eliminating the gender 
inequality, the annual growth rates of per capita income can be enhanced by approximately 0.5 
percentage point, by increasing from the current level of 3.6% to 4.1%. 
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Table 5: Steady-State Values for the Hypothetical Cases with Gender Equality 
 
 Fertility 
Female Labor Force
Participation Rate  
(%) 
Per Capita Output 
Growth Rate 
Current level 1.17 54.43 0.0360 
New steady states    
  Complete gender equality  
d ൌ ͩ, fͩ ൌ fͪ ൌ fͫ ൌ ͩ 0.98 67.51 0.0406 
  Gender equality by category 
d ൌ ͩ 0.97 59.30 0.0434 
fͩ ൌ ͩ 1.29 62.24 0.0346 
fͪ ൌ ͩ 1.10 56.50 0.0378 
fͫ ൌ ͩ 1.08 55.43 0.0345 
d ൌ ͩ, fͩ ൌ ͩ 1.04 64.84 0.0420 
Note: See Table 1 for the definition of the parameters, d, f1, f2, and f3.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
According to the simulation results, in the hypothetical gender-equal economy, the fertility 
rate becomes 0.98, lower than the current value, 1.17.  
 
The table also presents the new steady-state values that would be reached by the Korean 
economy if one of the four inequalities or the inequalities both in home production and labor market 
are eliminated for a comparison with the case of complete gender equality. The result in column 3, for 
example, shows that with the complete elimination of the gender discrimination in labor market alone 
(i.e., d = 1), the female labor market participation rate increases from 54.4% to 59.3%, and per capita 
income growth increases from 3.6% to 4.3% on average over a generation.  
 
Interestingly, removing only the gender inequality in home production (݂ͩ ൌ ͩሻ	or education 
(݂ͫ ൌ ͩሻ	lowers the growth rate of per capita income. The decrease in per capita output growth rate is 
mainly due to a decrease in male labor supply. As husbands increase the time they allocate to home 
production, child-rearing, and education with perfect gender equality in home production or in 
education, they will spend less time in the labor market. Another reason for the lower income growth 
rate per person in the case of perfect gender equality in home production (݂ͩ ൌ ͩሻ	c is an increase in 
fertility and thus, also in the population growth rate. 
 
B. Gender-Based Policies 
 
We consider the following three policies to promote gender equality: 
  
(i) Lower discrimination in the labor market: ݀	 ↑ 
(ii) Increase the time spent by a male on child-rearing: fͪ↑ 
(iii) Lower time cost for child-rearing: ݒ	 ↓ 
 
In Figure 2, we illustrate the change in three key variables of the most interest—fertility rate, 
female labor market participation rate, and per capita income growth—when the three policies are 
implemented. 
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Lowering the discrimination in the labor market by changing the value of d from 0.6 to 0.7 
increases the growth rate of per capita output by about 0.2 percentage point. When the distortion in 
the labor market is reduced, the female’s time allocated to market production significantly increases, 
contributing to the increase in per capita output growth. In this case, the fertility is lowered as females 
allocate more time to market production.  
 
If males increase time for child-rearing, i.e., raising fͪ (from 0.328 to 0.667), both female labor 
market participation and growth rate of per capita output increase. In this case, the fertility rate 
decreases. 
 
Contrastingly, when the rearing time needed per child v is lowered from 2.810 to 2.5, the 
growth rate of per capita output decreases. Since a decrease in v implies that the cost involved with 
increasing the quantity of children is lowered, the optimal decision is to increase the fertility. In this 
case, the increase in the fertility rate dominates the increase in aggregate output, eventually lowering 
the growth rate of the per capita output. 
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Figure 2:  The Impact of Gender Equality Policies
 
2.1  Fertility 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 2   continued 
2.2  Female’s Time Allocated to Market Production 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 2   continued 
2.3  Per Capita Output Growth
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper provides a theoretical framework that can explain the determination of female labor market 
participation, human capital accumulation, and economic growth in the Korean economy. We employ 
this framework to quantitatively analyze the output cost of gender inequality. Our results indicate that 
the output cost of gender inequality is quite sizable. If the gender inequality is completely eliminated, 
the female LFPR increases from 54.4% to 67.5%, and the annual per capita income growth rises from 
3.6% to 4.1% on average over a generation. The increase in the economic growth rate implies that with 
the complete elimination of gender inequality, per capita income will become approximately 15% 
higher over one generation. We believe that this growth-enhancing effect of gender equality is 
comparable to that of other types of policies contemplated in the Korean economy, such as increasing 
public infrastructure investment and removing unnecessary regulations. 
 
Among various policy measures related with gender equality that we contemplated in our 
study, we find that the most effective policy in terms of enhancing the growth rate of per capita 
income is eliminating the discrimination in the labor market. Policies that attempt to mitigate gender 
inequalities by reducing women’s time allocated to home production, child-rearing, and education 
would be helpful for enhancing growth when they are combined with the reduction of fundamental 
discrimination in the labor market and are designed to minimize negative influences on the male’s 
labor market participation.  
 
One intriguing lesson from our analysis for policy making is that, a particular policy to meet a 
specific goal can sometimes produce an adverse effect in terms of another goal of our concerns. One 
example of this point is the policy to eliminate discrimination against women in the labor market. On 
one hand, this policy will encourage more women to participate in the labor market and increase 
female labor force participation. However, it will also raise the opportunity cost of time for women, 
which will likely lower fertility and thus exacerbate the aging population problem. We can also show 
that childcare subsidies will lower the cost of child-rearing and therefore increase fertility while this 
policy will lower female labor market participation. Similarly, a public policy that promotes males’ 
engagement in child-rearing can increase female labor market participation and per capita income 
growth, but lower fertility.  
 
Since the early 2000s, the relationship between female labor market participation and fertility 
among OECD countries (based on the cross-sectional data) has been changed from a negative one to 
a positive one. The OECD data also show a positive relationship between the gender equality index 
and fertility in recent years. The results from our analysis indicate that these recent changes are not 
due to one particular policy but rather due to a combination of policies that are well coordinated. It 
would be wise for the Korean government to implement multiple public policies together in order to 
achieve a multiple number of goals. 
 
Our analysis has left a number of important issues related to gender inequality unaddressed. 
For example, our model does not consider the glass ceiling in promotion for women in business and in 
the public sector, social norms against gender equality, endogenous determination of bargaining power 
between wives and husbands, and the like. We will pursue a more expansive model in future studies 
that can be used to measure the economic costs of these other aspects of gender inequality in the 
Republic of Korea. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 
 
In this appendix, we derive equations needed to solve the steady states. Then we calculate the 
balanced growth rate. 
 
The household problem is to maximize the household utility function: 
 
௧ܷ ൌ ߟ௖ ͩͩ െ ߪ ܿ௧
ͩିఙ ൅ ߟ௤ ͩͩ െ ߪ ݍ௧
ͩିఙ 
൅ߟ௘ ቈ ͩͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൰
ͩିఙ
൅ ͩͩିఙ ൬ቀ
௡೟
ͪ ቁ
ఋ ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൰
ͩିఙ
቉ ൅ ௣ಲͩାఘ
ͩ
ͩିఙ ܿ௧ାͩͩିఙ  (A1) 
 
Subject to 
 
ݍ௧ ൌ ݍതሺͩ ൅ ݂ͩ ሻఊሺ݄௧௤ሻఊ݁௧௙ (A2) ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ݁௧௠൫ͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௠ 
 
൅ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ݁௧௙൫ͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௙ െ ܿ௧ െ ௣ಲ௖೟శͩͩା௥೟శͩ ൌ ͨ	  (A3) 
 
݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሾ݁௧௙ሿͩିఔͩሺሺͩ ൅ ݂ͫ ሻ߳௧௘ሻఔͪ  (A4) 
 
݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁̅ሺ ఓீ೟௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪሻ
ఔͩሾ݁௧௙ሿͩିఔͩሺሺͩ ൅ ݂ͫ ሻ߳௧௘ሻఔͪ  (A5) 
 
First-Order Conditions 
 
(ܿ௧ሻ	   ߟ௖ܿ௧ିఙ ൌ ߣ 
(ܿ௧ାͩሻ	  ௣ಲͩାఘ ܿ௧ାͩିఙ ൌ ߣ
௣ಲ
ͩା௥೟శͩ 
=>ሺ௖೟శͩ௖೟ ሻ
ఙ ൌ ͩା௥೟శͩఎ೎ሺͩାఘሻ  (A6) 
 
(݄௧௤ሻ ߟ௤ݍതͩିఙߛሺͩ ൅ ݂ሻఊሺͩିఙሻሺ݄௧௤ሻሺͩିఙሻఊିͩ൫݁௧௙൯
ͩିఙ ൌ ߟ௖ܿ௧ିఙሺͩ െ ߬ሻሺ݂ͩ ݁௧௠ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙ݓ௧௙ሻ  (A7) 
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ൌ ηୡc୲ି஢ሺͩ െ ߬ሻሾ݁௧௠ሺ݂ͫ ݊௧ሻݓ௧௠+݁௧௙ሺ݊௧߳௧௘ሻݓ௧௙ሿ   (A8) 
 
ሺ݊௧ሻ   ߟ௘ሺe୲ାͩ୫ ሻͩି஢ ቀͩͪቁ
ஔሺͩି஢ሻ δሺn୲ሻஔሺͩି஢ሻିͩ ൅ ߟ௘൫e୲ାͩ୤ ൯ͩି஢ ቀͩͪቁ
ஔሺͩି஢ሻ δሺn୲ሻஔሺͩି஢ሻିͩ 
 
ൌ ηୡc୲ି஢ሺͩ െ τሻሾe୲୤w୲୤ሺϵ୲ୣ ൅ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻvሻ ൅ ݁௧௠w୲୫ሺ݂ͫ ϵ୲ୣ ൅ ݂ͪ vሻሿ  (A9) 
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Since ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠ ൌ ܪ௧௠ , ݄௧௙ ൌ ܪ௧௙ , ௧ܻ௜ ൌ ௧ܻ  and ௧ܰ௠,௜ ൌ 	 ௧ܰ௙,௜ ൌ ͩͪ ௧ܰ   hold in equilibrium, 
 
ݓ௧௙ ൌ ͪௗఈ௘೟೑௛೟ೢ 	
௒೟
ே೟   (A10) 
and	 
 
ݓ௧௠ ൌ ͪఈ௒೟௘೟೘௛೟೘ೢே೟	=
ͪఈ
௘೟೑ሺͩି௙ͩ௛೟೜ି௙ͪ௩௡೟ି௙ͫ௡೟ఢ೟೐ሻ	
௒೟
ே೟ (A11) 
 
Dynamics for ࡺ࢚ 
 
The number of adults next period ௧ܰାͩ	is the surviving children born at time t. Since the number of 
households at time t is ே೟ͪ  and each household gives birth to ݊௧  that will survive with probability ݌௖ , the 
dynamics of ௧ܰ  follows: 
 
௧ܰାͩ ൌ ݊௧ ே೟ͪ  (A12) 
 
Savings in Equilibrium 
 
From (7) and (8), 
 
ܿ௧ ൅ ௣ಲ௖೟శͩሺͩା௥೟శͩሻ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧
ு  (A13) 
 
Substituting (A6) into (A13) yields, 
 
ܿ௧ ൅ ௣ಲͩା௥೟శͩ ሺ
ͩା௥೟శͩ
ఎ೎ሺͩାఘሻሻ
ͩ/ఙܿ௧ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (A14) 
ܿ௧ ൌ ͩͩା ೛ಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
ሺͩ െ ߬ሻݓ௧ு  (A15) 
 
Hence the saving rate ߠ௧	is 
 
ߠ௧ ൌ ͩ െ ͩͩା ೛ಲͩశೝ೟శͩሺ
ͩశೝ೟శͩ
ആ೎ሺͩశഐሻሻͩ/഑
 (A16) 
 
Since ݁௧௠ ൌ ܧ௧௠, ݁௧௙ ൌ ܧ௧௙ , ݄௧௠ ൌ ܪ௧௠  and ݄௧௙ ൌ ܪ௧௙  is held in equilibrium, total gross wage income for 
the household becomes: 
 
ݓ௧௠݁௧௠݄௧௠௪ ൌ ݀ିͩݓ௧௙݁௧௙݄௧௪ (A17) 
 
Then the budget constraint for the household becomes 
 
ݓ௧ு ൌ ݁௧௠݄௧௠௪ݓ௧௠ ൅ ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ ൌ ሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ (A18) 
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Then savings ܵ௧  in equilibrium are 
 
ܵ௧ ൌ ߠ௧ሺͩ െ ߬ሻሺ1+݀ିͩሻ݁௧௙݄௧௪ݓ௧௙ ൌ ߠ௧	Φ݁௧௙൫ͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௙   (A19) 
 
where Φ ൌ ሺͩ െ ߬ሻ൫ͩ ൅ ݀ିͩ൯. 
 
Interest Rate 
 
ݎ௧ାͩ ൌ ሺͩ െ ͪߙሻ ௒೟శͩ௄೟శͩ (A20) 
 
Dynamics for ࡷ࢚ 
 
ܭ௧ାͩ 		ൌ ͨ.ͭ൫ ௧ܰ௠ ൅ ௧ܰ௙൯ܵ௧ 		ൌ ௧ܰ௙ܵ௧   
ൌ Φ ௧ܰ௙ߠ௧݁௧௙൫ͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘൯ݓ௧௙   ൌ ݀ߙΦߠ௧ ௧ܻ (A21) 
 
௄೟శͩ
௄೟ ൌ ݀ߙΦߠ௧
௒೟
௄೟ (A22) 
 
௧ܻ ൌ തܻሺா೟
೘ே೟೘
௄೟ ሻ
ఈሺா೟
೑ே೟೑
௄೟ ሻ
ఈ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈܭ௧  (A23) 
 
௒೟
௄೟ ൌ തܻሺ
ͩ
௞೟೘ሻ
ఈሺ ͩ௞೟೑ሻ
ఈ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ ,   (A24) 
 
where ݇௧௠ ൌ ௄೟	ா೟೘ே೟೘ and ݇௧
௙ ൌ ௄೟	ா೟೑ே೟೑ 
 
Since ݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁௧ାͩ௠  ݇௧௠ ൌ ݇௧௙. (A25) 
 
௒೟
௄೟ ൌ തܻ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧
௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ ͩ௞೟೑ሻ
ͪఈ   (A26) 
 
Dynamics for Education 
 
From (6), (17), and (18), 
 
݁௧ାͩ௙ ൌ ݁௧ାͩ௠ ൌ ݁̅ ቀ ఓீ೟௡೟ೌ ே೟/ͪቁ
ఔͩ ሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ ൌ ݁̅ ቀఓఛሺͩାௗሻఈ௡೟ೌ /ͪ ቁ
ఔͩ ቀሺͩି∅ሻషͩ௒೟ே೟ ቁ
ఔͩ ሺ݁௧௙ሻͩିఔͩሾ߳௧௘ሿఔͪ  (A27) 
By definition, 
 
௧ܻ
ͨ.ͭ݁௧௙ ௧ܰ
ൌ ௧ܻܭ௧
ܭ௧
݁௧௙ ௧ܰ௙
ൌ ௧ܻܭ௧ ݇௧
௙  
ൌ തܻ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ݇௧௙ሻͩିͪఈ  (A28) 
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Dynamics for ࢑࢚ࢌ 
 
݇௧ାͩ௙ = ௄೟శͩா೟శͩ೑ ே೟శͩ೑ ൌ
௄೟శͩ
ா೟శͩ೑ ͨ.ͭ௡೟ே೟/ͪ
ൌ ௗఈ஍ఏ೟௒೟ͨ.ͪͭா೟శͩ೑ ௡೟ே೟ 
= ௗఈ஍ఏ೟௒೟/ே೟
ͨ.ͪͭ௡೟௘̅൬ഋഓሺͩశ೏ሻഀ೙೟/ͪ ൰
ഌͩ൬ೊ೟ಿ೟൰
ഌͩሺ௘೟೑ሻͩషഌͩൣఢ೟೐൧
ഌͪ 
= ௗఈ஍ఏ೟ሾͪሺͩି௕ሻሿഌͪ௘̅ሺ௡೟ሻͩషഌͩ ሺߤ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻߙሻ
ିఔͩ ൬ ௒೟ͨ.ͭ௘೟೑ே೟൰
ͩିఔͩ ͪሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪ  
=Γߠ௧ 	൬ ௒೟ͨ.ͭ௘೟೑ே೟൰
ͩିఔͩ ሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪ  
=Γߠ௧	ሺ തܻΓͩ ሻͩିఔͩ 	ሺͩ െ ݂݄௧௤ሻఈሺͩିఔͩሻ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺͩିఔͩሻሺ߳௧௘ሻିఔͪሺ݇௧௙ሻሺͩିͪఈሻሺͩିఔͩሻ  (A29) 
 
where Γ ൌ ͪௗఈ஍௘̅ሺ௡೟ሻͩషഌͩ ሺߤ߬ሺͩ ൅ ݀ሻߙሻ
ିఔͩ  
 
Steady-State Growth Rate 
 
From (A11), (A21), and (A24) 
  
௧ܻାͩ
௧ܰାͩ
ൌ ௧ܻାͩܭ௧ାͩ
ܭ௧ାͩ
௧ܰାͩ
ൌ ௧ܻାͩܭ௧ାͩ ܭ௧ାͩ
ͩ
௧ܰାͩ
 
ൌ തܻ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ
ͩ
݇௧ାͩ௙
ሻͪఈ	݀ߙΦߠ௧ ௧ܻ ͩ݊௧ ௧ܰͪ
 
=ͪ തܻ	ሺͩ െ ݂ͩ ݄௧௤ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊௧ െ ݂ͫ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈ	ሺͩ െ ݄௧௤ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊௧ െ ݊௧߳௧௘ሻఈሺ ͩ௞೟శͩ೑ ሻ
ͪఈ	݀ߙΦߠ௧ ͩ௡೟
௒೟
ே೟ 
In the steady state 
 
ͩ ൅ ߛ௒/ே ൌ ͪ തܻሺͩ െ ݂݄௤∗ െ ݂ͪ ݒ݊∗ െ ݂ͫ ݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈሺͩ െ ݄௤∗ െ ሺͪ െ ݂ͪ ሻݒ݊∗ െ ݊∗߳௘∗ሻఈሺ݇∗ሻିͪఈ݀ߙΦߠ∗ሺ݊∗ሻିͩ 
 (A30) 
 
where the variables with * are steady-state values and ݇௙∗ ൌ ሺ ௄௘೑ே೑ሻ∗. 
 
When ݂ increases, depending on what happens to the steady-state solutions, particularly ݄௤ , the 
steady-state growth rate can either increase or not. 
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